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Abstract
Corporate insiders, particularly managers, have access to their rmsprivate in-
formation as well as control over their rmsoperational decisions. In this paper, we
consider a setting where managers manipulate the rmsreal activities in anticipation
of subsequent insider trading opportunities. We nd these managers choose produc-
tion quantities that are strictly higher than the quantities absent insider trading. The
increased production outputs lead to lower rm prots but higher consumer surplus.
When we allow the managers to trade not only in their own rms but also in their rival
rmsstocks, we nd that the competition among insiders in the nancial market drives
down the expected insider trading prots and their incentives to distort production de-
cisions. That is, the competition in the nancial market softens the competition in the
product market, indicating an implicit substitutable relation between the competitions
in these two markets.
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1 Introduction
The political and academic debate surrounding insider trading is long-standing.1 Under
U.S. law, insider trading can be legal or illegal. While corporate insiders can trade their
rms stocks legally in compliance with government regulations and their rms policies,
the SEC refers to illegal insider trading as "buying or selling a security, in breach of a
duciary duty or other relationship of trust and condence, while in possession of material,
nonpublic information about the security."2 Prior research on insider trading in nance, law,
and economics often focuses on the legality of insider trading. In this paper, however, we
intend to evaluate the "real" e¤ect of insider trading - how insider trading opportunities
a¤ect the preceding operational decisions made by rm managers.
The "insiders" in the context of insider trading are often directors, o¢ cers, or other key
employees of the rms involved. In fact, the majority of insiders have "inside" information
about a rm precisely because they work at the rm. In addition to access to the rmspri-
vate information, these corporate insiders typically have control over the rmsoperations.
This paper seeks to address whether insiders use their control of the rmsreal activities to
benet themselves through subsequent insider trading. Specically, we examine the inter-
action of managersproduction decisions and stock trading decisions, as well as the role of
information and disclosure in this joint decision process.
It is not surprising that managers use accounting discretions to facilitate their proting
from insider trades. Numerous analytical studies (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Bushman and
Indjejikian, 1995; Huddart et al., 2001; etc.) demonstrate disclosure strategies adopted
by the managers to increase insider trading prots. Empirical evidences also conrm that
managers use nonpublic information or biased disclosures for higher trading gains (Penman,
1982; Elliott, Morse and Richardson, 1984; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Jagolinzer, 2009; etc.).
However, managers can also manipulate real activities for the same purpose. Prior research
shows that managers often use real activities opportunistically, such as to avoid reporting
loss (Roydhowdhury 2006) or to meet earnings benchmark (Gunny 2005). In this paper, we
1For example, Manove (1989) shows that insider trading discourages investment and reduces e¢ ciency.
Ausubel (1990) and Fishman and Hagerty (1992) show that insider trading decreases the informativeness of
a rms stock price. Glosten (1989) and Leland (1992) show that insider trading decreases the rms market
liquidity. On the other hand, Manne (1966) argues that insider trading helps reduce agency problems by
aligning the interests of the shareholders and managers of a rm. Bernhardt, Hollield, and Hughson (1995)
nd that insider trading expedites the dissemination of private information and the price discovery process.
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) show that insider trading could improve risk-sharing among noise traders
with stochastic liquidity needs. Laux (2010) demonstrates that investment decisions, specically related to
the abandonment of projects, can be improved when managers are allowed to time their trading activities
based on insider information.
2See http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm for more details.
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show managers could manipulate real activities to maximize their personal trading prots.
Extending Kyle (1985), we consider a setting where an insider is the manager who makes
operational decisions prior to trading in the rms equity. We nd introducing the possibility
that the manager may trade in the rms security creates incentives for increased production
quantity, which is strictly higher than the output quantity absent insider trading. Increased
quantity results because the managers ex-ante expected trading prot increases in the vari-
ance of the monopoly rms future prot, and this variance is amplied by higher production
quantity. Higher production quantity thus leads to lower rm value but higher expected in-
sider trading prot. When making production quantity decisions, the manager trades o¤ the
loss in his current stake in the rm and his personal gain from insider trading.
This result is largely consistent with the conventional wisdom that insider trading is
detrimental to rm value. Specically, we show that decreased rm value results from the
upwardly distorted production quantity. However, the e¤ect of the increased production
quantity on social welfare may be quite di¤erent as a higher output often leads to increased
consumer surplus. From a regulatory perspective, this benet should be balanced against the
well-understood costs of information asymmetry in the capital markets on market liquidity.
We also nd that information precision is inversely related to the managers ex-ante
expected trading prot. The more accurate the accounting signal, the lower the expected
trading prot for the manager, and the lower the incentive for the manager to distort produc-
tion quantity decision. Thus, the information precision is positively related to the expected
nal rm value.3 Further, we nd that expected rm value increases in the managers cur-
rent stake in the rm, as the managers current stake in the rm also reduces his incentives
to distort the quantity decision. These results hold in both monopoly and duopoly product
markets.
When there are two rms competing in a Cournot market, we vary the insider trading
regimes by allowing the managers to trade 1) only in their own rms stock, or 2) in both their
own and rival rms stock. We nd that the managers insider trading prot is lower when he
can trade in both his own and rival rmsstocks than when he trades in his own stocks only.
That is, the competition in the nancial market reduces the expected insider trading prots.
The reduced expected insider trading prot also in turn reduces the managers incentive to
distort production quantity decisions, thus increasing the expected rm prot.
We contribute to the extant literature in three ways. First, we are the rst to examine the
e¤ect of insider trading on managersmanipulation of real activities. While prior research
3This result is largely consistent with empirical evidence provided by prior studies such as Welker (1995),
Lang and Lundholm (1996), Botosan (1997), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), and Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000).
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focuses on managers using their informational advantages and/or disclosure strategies to
increase personal trading gains, our results imply that managers can also exploit their control
over their rmsoperations for the same purpose. Further, we demonstrate the managers
actions a¤ect not only his own rm, but also the consumer and the society at large.
Second, our results shed light on the interaction between nancial markets and prod-
uct markets. We nd that the competition among insiders in the nancial market drives
down their informational advantage, a nding similar to that of Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992). Further, we nd that competition in the nancial market in turn dampens the over-
competition in the product market, which implies an implicit substitutable relation between
the competitions in these two markets. Thus, policy-makers should take into consideration
the potential e¤ect on one market while regulating the other.
Third, we show that the precision of accounting signals could reduce the expected insider
trading prots, as well as the managersincentives to distort production decisions. An ac-
counting system that generates signals of high precision therefore mitigates agency problems,
improves total shareholder value, and helps eliminate informational asymmetry between the
corporate insiders and other traders in the nancial market.
Our results are readily testable with empirical data. We predict that a rm whose
CEO has higher percentage of stock ownership is more likely to engage in real activities
manipulation, i.e., overproduction. However, the degree of competition within the industry
in which the rm operates could mitigate the overproduction problem. The more competitive
the industry, the less likely the participating rms overproduce, holding the CEOsstock
ownership equal. The precision of accounting information, which can be proxied by the
volatility of earnings, should also be inversely related to the executivesmanipulation of real
activities.
Prior research on the relationship between insider trading and real activities is sparse.
Similar to our paper, Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002) also combine a Kyle (1985) model with
product market competition. However, their setting is quite di¤erent from ours. While
we assume the noise in product market demand is an additive term and is realized at the
end of the game, the noise term in Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002) is multiplicative and is
learned by the manager before the production quantity decision. As a result, the second
order condition is not always satised in their setting, and the normality condition of the
Kyle model is violated in some circumstances.
Our paper also relates to prior studies of insider trading and accounting disclosure. Kim
and Verrecchia (1994) nd accounting disclosures could actually lead to increased information
asymmetry and less liquidity in a Kyle setting. Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) also show
that disclosure of private information can actually increase the managerspersonal gain from
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insider trading by crowding out other informed traders from the nancial market. Huddart
et al. (2001) examine the case when insiders must publicly disclose their trades after these
trades are completed. As a result, the insiders adopt a dissimulation strategy by adding
noise in their orders. Gao and Liang (2013) evaluate a rms optimal disclosure policy for
the secondary stock market. Accounting disclosure reduces the informational asymmetry
between the insiders and noise traders, but also leads to a less informative stock price and
decreased investment e¢ ciency. Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996) consider principal-agent
settings where the principal o¤ers a best linear contract to the agent correctly extracting the
agents anticipated prots from subseqent insider trading. When insider trading prots are
expected to be part of the managers implicit compensation, disclosure leads to decreased
insider trading prots and makes it more costly to hire and retain managers. None of these
studies involve product market competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Sections 3 presents the analyses and results for a monopoly setting, and Section 4 extends
the analyses to a Cournot duopoly setting. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with one real good and two nancial goods. The real good is
manufactured by two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, that compete in a Cournot market. The two
nancial goods are these two rmsshares, which are traded in the stock market. The linear
inverse demand function for the real good is p = ea   q1   q2, where p is the unit price for
the product; ea is the intercept of market demand; and q1 and q2 are the output quantities
produced and sold by each rm, respectively. The common market demand faced by the two
rms is uncertain, with ea  N (ma;a), and is only realized after the production quantity
decisions have been made.4 Without loss of generality, we assume the rmsmarginal cost
is 0.
Each of the two rms is run by a risk-neutral manager, who is responsible for the rms
operations. These managers are the "insiders" of their rms, as they have access to their
rms information and control over their rmsoperations. At the very beginning of the
game, each manager privately receives a noisy signal about the market demand ea. The
signal is esi = ea + ei, with e  N (0;) and i 2 f1; 2g: The precision of the signal s, 1 ;
represents the accuracy of accounting information.
The two rms operate under the same information disclosure regime. Either both rms
4Our assumption of common market demand simplies the proofs but is not critical. When the two rms
have rm-specic demand information, all the major results remain qualitatively the same.
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must disclose their private signals, or neither rm discloses. If the managers disclose the
private signals, the disclosure will be made to all participants in the product market as well
as the nancial market. If the managers do not disclose the private signals, then they cannot
disclose to anybody.5 We assume the disclosures are always truthful if they are required.
Further, we assume all aspects of the model, including the precision of the accounting system,
1

; are common knowledge for everybody in the economy.
While we do not explicitly model the initial contracting between the original owners of
the rm and the manager, we presume that, prior to our modelling frame, the managers
were granted a certain amount of restricted stock from the rms at which they work. The
restricted stock amounts to 0 < ! < 1 portion of the respective rms total value. We
assume that the managers current stake in the rm is su¢ ciently small and does not a¤ect
the availability of the remaining shares being traded on the stock market.6 For simplicity,
we assume away any other compensation that managers may get from the rms.
The managers also have the chance to purchase more of the rmsshares. Following Kyle
(1985), we consider three types of participants in the stock markets. The rst type is the
risk-neutral competitive market makers, who set the pricing rules and make zero trading
prots. The second type is the noise traders who, for exogenous reasons, trade randomly.
The third type is the insider-managers who make the quantity decisions for the respective
rms, and observe the nal market demand ea = a. The demand submitted by manager i is
denoted edi, and the demand of the noisy trader is denoted eu  N (0;u). The market maker
observes the total order ow eDi, but cannot distinguish di or u separately. She then sets the
market clearing price for the rms stock, Pi:
The timeline of the events is as follows.
1. The manager of rm i learns a private noisy signal of the market demand esi.
2. In a mandatory disclosure environment, each manager i discloses his received signal si.
In a mandatory non-disclosure regime, the managers do not disclose any information.
3. Manager i makes production quantity decisions qi, observable by all players.
4. The market demand a is realized, as well as the nal rm value Vi; both privately
observed by manager i.
5. Manager i submits his order di to the market maker i to purchase more shares.
5This assumption is largely consistent with the spirit of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which attempts to
rule out the possibility of selective disclosure.
6Since the managers cannot trade the restricted stocks, they only want to maximize the long-term value
of these stocks, not the short-term price uctuations.
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6. Market maker i receives a total order ow Di and executes the trades.
In summary, the scenario described is a two-stage game involving quantity competition
followed by a Kyle model. The solution concept we use is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
found through backward induction. The managers in our setting have two decision variables:
the rmsproduction quantities and their own personal investments in the rmsshares. The
market makersproblem is to set prices for the rmsstocks. We focus on linear strategies
of the players, and evaluate the impact of subsequent insider trading on the product market
competition by comparing the production quantities and the expected rm prots under
di¤erent trading and disclosure regimes.
3 Monopoly with insider trading
We rst examine a benchmark case involving a monopoly instead of a duopoly. The
monopoly case shows how accounting information and subsequent insider trading could a¤ect
an managers quantity decision, absent strategic competition in the product market. The
timeline is the same as in the duopoly case. First the manager gets a private signal es =ea + e, based on which he updates his belief of the product market demand to (ajs) 
N

as+ma
a+
; a
a+

:
If insider trading is impossible, the manager would simply maximize his stake in the
expected rm value. His objective function is
max
q
! (q(E [ajs]  q))(1)
= !

q
as+ ma
a + 
  q2

:
The optimal production quantity chosen by the manager is q = 1
2

as+ma
a+

: Since the
market demand is uncertain, the rm value is thus
eV (s;ea) = 1
2

as+ ma
a + 
ea  1
2

as+ ma
a + 

:
It is easy to see that the rm value is normally distributed, with q a¤ecting both the mean
and the variance of the rm value, eV  N 1
4

as+ma
a+
2
; 1
4

as+ma
a+
2
a
a+

.
We then examine the scenario when insider trading is allowed. The manager chooses
production quantity bq by maximizing his total payo¤
(2) E
h
!eV (bq)i+ E [ (bq)] :
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Given bq, the rm value is eV  N bq as+ma
a+
  bq ; bq2 a+
a+

:7 The manager then observes
the realized market demand ea = a; or eV = V: He and the noise traders both submit their
demands, d and u, respectively, for the rm shares to the market maker. The manager does
not observe the noise tradersdemand eu: The total order ow received by the market maker
is eD = ed+ eu:The market maker sets the market clearing price by setting
(3) P (D) = E [V jD = d+ u] :
The manager decides his demand d by maximizing his personal trading prot
(4) E
h
(V   P (D)) djeV = V i :
As is standard in the Kyle model, we focus on linear strategies of the players. That is, the
manager uses a linear strategy in determining his demand by setting
d (V ) =  +  eV ;
and the market maker uses a linear pricing rule
(5) P
ed+ eu = + ed+ eu :
Proposition 1. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, there exists a
unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager and the market maker
as follows:
 =  
p
ur
a
a+

as+ma
a+
  bq ;
 =
p
ubqr a
a+
;
 = bq as+ma
a+
  bq ;
 = bq
2
p
u
q
a
a+
;
and bq = 1
4!
 
2!
as+ ma
a + 
+
r
u
a
a + 
!
:
Proof. See appendix.
7Normality of the nal rm value is a critical condition for obtaining the results of our paper. Bagnoli et
al. (2001) and Noeldeke and Troeger (2001) show the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of a linear equilibrium in the Kyle model.
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Proposition 1 presents a result similar to that of a one-period Kyle model, but incor-
porating a real production decision by the manager. Allowing insider trading distorts the
managers incentive when making the quantity decision for his rm. Since the mean and
the variance of the nal rm value are both functions of bq, the quantity decision a¤ects the
managers subsequent trading decision, as well as the market makers pricing strategy.
When insider trading is banned, the production quantity is 1
2

as+ma
a+

:When insider
trading is allowed, the production quantity is 1
4!

2!as+ma
a+
+
q
u
a
a+

: It is obvious
that the production quantity is always higher when insider trading is allowed. This result
occurs because the managers ex-ante trading prots, E [] = bq
2
q
u
a
a+
; increase in bq.
The manager thus has incentives to increase the production quantity beyond the prot-
maximizing level.
One implication of Proposition 1 is the potentially improved consumer welfare as a result
of insider trading. When the manager of the monopolistic rm has the opportunity to trade
as an insider, the production quantity decision will be upwardly distorted. The consumers of
the real good will therefore enjoy the lower selling price of the rms products, hence higher
consumer surplus.
Corollary 2. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, the managers
ex-ante expected trading prot is
E [] = ma
r
u
a
a + 
+
1
2!
u
a
a + 
;
which decreases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1

:
Proof. See appendix.
The result presented in Corollary 2 is intuitive. The managers ex-ante trading prot
is a function of the variance of the rms value. The higher the rm values variance, the
higher the informational advantage the insider has. Thus, the precision of the accounting
signal a¤ects the managers expected trading prot in a negative way. The more precise the
accounting signal is, the less trading prot the manager can expect.
Corollary 3. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, the ex-ante
expected rm prot is
E
heV i = 1
16!2

4!2m2a   u
a
a + 

;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1

:
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Proof. See appendix.
When insider trading is impossible, the expected rm prot is 1
4

E
h
aes+ma
a+
i2
= m
2
a
4
:
It is obvious that the expected rm prot is lower when insider trading is allowed. The ex-
ante expected rm prot with insider trading is lower than the monopoly prot due to the
distorted quantity decision. Essentially, the manager trades o¤ his current stake in the rm
and his personal gain from insider trading when making the production quantity decision.
Thus, the higher the managers current stake in the rm, the less distortion in his quantity
decision, and the higher the rm prot.
We can also see that the expected ex-ante rm prot increases in the accounting precision
1

: This result occurs because accounting precision reduces the managers ex-ante trading
prot and thus his incentives to distort the quantity decision. A very precise accounting
signal would thus prevent managers from engaging in subsequent insider trading, and hence
improve total rm value.
Note that since we assume the production quantity is observable by every player, the
disclosure environment does not play a role in the monopoly case. After the manager receives
a private signal s, the disclosure of this new information will only a¤ect his quantity decision
in the presence of a strategic rival in the product market competition. Once the production
quantity is observed, all private information contained in s is also revealed.
4 Duopoly with insider trading
Next we examine the case when there are two rms competing in a Cournot product
market. Having two rms brings signicant impacts in both the product market and the
nancial market in our setting. In addition to the expected change in product quantity
decisions, it also changes the behavior of managers when they make trading decisions.
4.1 When insider trading is not allowed
When insider trading is not allowed, the manager of each rm simply maximizes his own
stake in the rm. In a mandatory disclosure environment, both managers have to disclose
their private signals, s1 and s2. Thus they both get to use the two signals to update their
belief about the market demand to (ajs1; s2)  N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a
2a+

. Manager 1s
9
problem is:
max
q1
! (q1(E [ajs1; s2]  q1   q2))(6)
= !

q1
ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  q1 (q1 + q2)

Manager 2s problem is symmetric. Solving for the production quantity as in a standard
Cournot problem, we have
q1 =
1
3
ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
:
In a mandatory non-disclosure environment, the managers only observe their respective
signals privately. Therefore, they only get to update their beliefs about the product market
demand a once. For example, manager 1 believes that the market demand is (ajs1) 
N

as1+ma
a+
; a
a+

. Since manager 1 does not observe manager 2s signal s2, he can
only expect rm 2s manager to make production quantity decision based on the original
information a:
Manager 1s problem is therefore:
max
q1
! (q1(E [ajs1]  q1   E [q2]))(7)
= !

q1
as1 + ma
a + 
  q1 (q1 + E [q2])

Taking the rst order condition with regard to q1 and setting it to zero, we have
(8) q1 =
1
2
as1 + ma
a + 
  1
2
E [q2] :
Since manager 1 doesnt know the signal received by manager 2, and manager 1 knows that
manager 2 doesnt know manager 1s signal, he expects
(9) E [q2] =
1
2
ma   1
2
E [q1] :
Applying symmetry and solving for the production quantities, we have
qi =
1
3
(   a)ma + 2asi
a + 
:
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4.2 When managers only trade in their own rmsstocks
When insider trading is allowed, we rst consider the case when each manager trades in
his own rms stock only. That is, the two rms compete in a duopolistic product market,
but their managers still act as the monopolistic insiders of their respective stocks in the
nancial market. Thus, the second stage of the game (Kyle model) is similar to that of the
monopoly setting, while the rst stage of the game (Cournot) is di¤erent.
The manager i has two decision variables. First, he chooses production quantity bqi by
maximizing his total payo¤
(10) E
h
!eVi (bqi)i+ E [i (bqi)] :
Second, he chooses his demand for his rms share, di, by maximizing his total trading prot
(11) E
h
Vi   ePi  eDi dijeVi = Vii :
In the second stage of the game, the market maker determines the market clearing price for
rm is stock by setting
(12) Pi (Di) = E [VijDi = di + u] :
Again, we focus on the playerslinear strategies. Manager is is
di (Vi) = i + ieVi;
and the market maker is pricing rule is
(13) Pi
edi + eu = i + i edi + eu :
4.2.1 In a mandatory disclosure environment
In a mandatory disclosure regime, the rms must disclose s1 and s2 to the public.
All players get to update their beliefs about the product market demand to (ajs1; s2) 
N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a
2a+

: Thus, given bq1 and bq2, rm 1s nal value is eV1  N bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ; bq21 a2a+ :
Proposition 4. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent
insider trading where the managers only trade in their own rms shares, there exists a
unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager i and the market maker
11
i; where i; j 2 f1; 2g; as follows:
i =  
p
ur
a
2a+

ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
  2bq ;
i =
p
ubqr a
2a+
;
i = bq ma+a(si+sj)2a+   2bq ;
i =
bq
2
p
u
q
a
2a+
;
and bqi = bqj = bq = 1
6!
 
2!
ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 
+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
Proof. See appendix.
As with the results in Proposition 1 about a quantity-setting manager in a monopoly,
the results in Proposition 4 reect the change in the nature of the product market structure.
Comparing the managers quantity decisions when insider trading is not possible, qi =
1
3
ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
; and the managersquantity decisions when insider trading is allowed, bqi =
1
6!

2!
ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
+
q
u
a
2a+

; obviously we have bqi > qi again.
Similar to the monopoly case, we can expect improved consumer surplus as a result of the
increased production quantities. Thus, the possibility exists that subsequent insider trading
also improves consumer welfare in a duopoly market.
Corollary 5. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent in-
sider trading where the managers only trade in their own rmsshares, managers ex-ante
trading prot is
E [i] =
ma
6
r
u
a
2a + 
+
u
12!
a
2a + 
;
which decreases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1

:
Proof. See appendix.
This result is also similar to that of Corollary 2. The sum of the two managers expected
trading prot in a Cournot product market is only a 1
3
of the managers trading prot in
a monopoly market, indicating that product market competition reduces insider trading
prots. In a duopoly setting, the accounting precision also decreases the managers ex-ante
trading prot.
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Corollary 6. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent in-
sider trading where the managers only trade in their own rmsshares, each rms ex-ante
expected prot is
E
heVii = 1
6!
 
2!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
1
3!
 
2!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1

:
Proof. See appendix.
This result is very similar to that of Corollary 3, showing that the production quantities
chosen by the managers in the Cournot rms are distorted due to the subsequent trading prof-
its. The expected rm value when insider trading is not allowed is 1
9

E
h
ma+a(esi+esj)
2a+
i2
=
m2a
9
;which is larger than the expected rm value when insider trading is allowed. The amount
of distortion is however smaller compared to the monopoly case, because the managers ex-
pected gain from the insider trading achieved through the quantity distortion is smaller.
Further, we show that expected ex-ante rm value in the Cournot setting still increases in
the managers current stake in the rm and the accounting precision, both of which decrease
the managers incentives to distort the rms quantity decision.
4.2.2 In a mandatory non-disclosure environment
In a non-disclosure regime, manager 1 does not see the signal received by manager 2. At
the decision time for q1, he can only update his belief about the product market demand
to (ajs1)  N

as1+ma
a+
; a
a+

: However, after he observes his rival rms production
decision q2; he could back out the signal s2 and thus further update his belief to (ajs1; s2) 
N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a
2a+

: The market makers also observe both q1 and q2 and are able to
undertake the same updating of a.
Proposition 7. In a Cournot product market with mandatory non-disclosure, and subse-
quent insider trading where the managers only trade in their own rmsshares, there exists
a unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager i and the market
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maker i; where i; j 2 f1; 2g; as follows:
i =  
p
ur
a
2a+

asi+ma
a+
  bqi   bqj ;
i =
p
ubqir a2a+
;
i = bqi asi+maa+   bqi   bqj ;
i =
1
2
bqip
u
q
a
2a+
;
and bqi = 1
6!
 
2!

2
asi + ma
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
Proof. See appendix.
The result presented in Proposition 7 is a combination of Kyle model and Darrough
(1993). While Darrough (1993) models rm-specic market demand with di¤erent precision
in the accounting signals, we assume common market demand and common accounting
precision. The resulting strategies are however qualitatively the same.
In the non-disclosure regime, manager is trading prot is
(14) E [i] =
1
6

2
asi + ma
a + 
 ma
r
u
a
2a + 
+
u
12!
a
2a + 
;
and the expected rm prot is
(15) E
heVii = 1
6!
 
2!

2
asi + ma
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
a (si + 2sj) + 3ma
3 (a + )
:
Note that since si and sj are noisy but unbiased signals of the market demand a, the expected
production quantity E [bqi] at time 0 (before the managers learn si and sj) are the same in
a mandatory disclosure regime and in a mandatory non-disclosure environment. Therefore,
the ex-ante insider trading prot and rm value are also the same in the two disclosure
environments.
Another interesting case of insider trading regimes is when the managers can trade only
in his rival rmsstocks, instead of his own rmsstocks. This situation could happen when
managers are forbidden from engaging in insider trading. Huang (2006) examines "substitute
trading" when an manager trades in the stocks of a rm whose realized value is correlated
with his own rms. In our setting, since the two rms are symmetric and manager i is a
complete insider of manager js rm, the managerspayo¤s would be exactly the same as
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when the managers trade only in their own rmsstocks. Thus, managers in our setting
would have the same payo¤ regardless the legality of insider trading.
4.3 When managers trade in both their competitors and own
rmsstocks
Now we allow the managers to trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsstocks. This
new assumption leads to duopolistic competition of the two managers both in the product
market and in the nancial market. The manager i still chooses production quantity bqi by
maximizing his total payo¤
E
h
!eVi (bqi)i+ E [i (bqi)] :
He chooses his demand for his own rm is share, dii, by maximizing his total trading prot
in rm is shares
(16) E
h
Vi   ePi  eDi diijeVi = Vii ;
and his demand for rm js share, dij, by maximizing his total trading prot in rm js
shares
(17) E
h
E [VjjVi]  ePj  eDj dijjeVi = Vii :
The market maker for rm is stock sets the market clearing price by setting
(18) Pi (Di) = E [VijDi = dii + dji + u] :
Manager is linear strategies are
(19) dii (Vi) = ii + iieVi
and
(20) dij (Vi) = ij + ij eVi:
Lastly, the market maker is linear pricing rule is
(21) Pi
edii + edji + eu = i + i edii + edji + eu :
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4.3.1 In a mandatory disclosure environment
In a mandatory disclosure regime, all players update their beliefs about the product
market demand to (ajs1; s2)  N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a
2a+

: Thus, given bq1 and bq2, rm 1s
value is eV1  N bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ; bq21 a2a+ :
Proposition 8. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent
insider trading where the managers trade in both their rival rmsand own rms shares,
there exists a unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager i and the
market maker i; where i; j 2 f1; 2g; as follows:
ii = ji =  
p
ur
a
2a+

ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
  2bq ;
ii = ji =
1bq
p
u
a
2a+
;
i = bq ma+a(si+sj)2a+   2bq ;
i =
bq
3
r
a
2a+p
u
:
and bqi = 1
9!
 
3!
ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 
+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
Proof. See appendix.
Compared to Proposition 4, Proposition 8 reects the change in the playersstrategies
as a result of the change in the nancial market in addition to the change in the product
market. We know rm is quantity decision is 1
9!

3!
ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
+
q
u
a
2a+

when
insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in both their own and rival rmsstocks.
Firm is quantity decision is 1
6!

2!
ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
+
q
u
a
2a+

when insider trading is
allowed and the managers only trade in their own rmsstocks. Firm is quantity decision
is 1
3
ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
when insider trading is not allowed. Obviously the quantity decision is
lowest when insider trading is not allowed, and highest when insider trading is allowed and
the managers only trade in their own rmsstocks.
Corollary 9. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent in-
sider trading where the managers trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsshares,the
managers ex-ante trading prot is
E [i] =
u
27!
a
2a + 
+
ma
9
r
u
a
2a + 
;
16
which decreases in accounting precision 1

:
Proof. See appendix.
Compared to the expected insider trading prot when managers only trade in their own
rms stocks, his trading prot when he can trade in both rms stocks is much lower.
This result is consistent with Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) in that competition in the
nancial market reduces insider trading prot. Interestingly, the reduced insider trading
prot also reduces the managers incentive to distort the rms operational decisions. Thus,
when managers trade in both their own and rival rmsstocks, the production quantities
are lower, and the expected rm prots are higher, than when managers only trade in their
own rmsstocks.
Corollary 10. In a Cournot product market with mandatory disclosure, and subsequent
insider trading where the managers trade in both their rival rmsand own rms shares,
the rms earn an ex-ante expected prot
E
heVii = 1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
! 
ma   2
 
1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1

:
Proof. See appendix.
Comparing the expected rm values in di¤erent insider trading regimes, we know the
rm value is lowest when insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in only their own
rmsstocks, and highest when insider trading is not possible. The expected ex-ante rm
value when insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in both their own and rival
rmsstocks is ranked in the middle.
4.3.2 In a mandatory non-disclosure environment
In a mandatory non-disclosure environment, when the managers are allowed to trade in
both their own and rival rmsstocks, the strategies of the managers and market makers are
characterized as follows.
Proposition 11. In a Cournot product market with mandatory non disclosure, and sub-
sequent insider trading where the managers trade in both their rival rmsand own rms
shares, there exists a unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager
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i and the market maker i; where i; j 2 f1; 2g; as follows:
ii = ji =   1p
2bq2i bq2j
p
ur
a
a+
(2bqi   bqj)ma+asia+   bqi   bqj ;
ii = ji =
1p
2bq2i bq2j
p
u
a
a+
;
i = (2bqi   bqj)ma+asia+   bqi   bqj ;
i =
p
2bq2i bq2j
3
r
a
a+p
u
:
and bqi = 1
9!
 
3!

2
ma + asi
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
Proof. See appendix.
Again, since si and sj are noisy but unbiased signals of the common market demand
a, the expected production quantity E [bqi] at time 0 is the same in a mandatory disclosure
regime and in a mandatory non-disclosure environment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we intend to identify and evaluate a previously overlooked consequence of
insider trading: real activities manipulation through overproduction. Specically, we study
insider trading in a setting where the manager of the rm also makes operating decisions in
anticipation of subsequent insider trading opportunities. The e¤ect of operating decisions
on the variability of future rm value is the channel through which operating decisions also
inuence subsequent insider trading.
We nd the production quantity with subsequent insider trading is strictly higher than
quantity absent insider trading, leading to lower expected rm value but potentially higher
consumer surplus. We also nd that the competition among insiders in the nancial market
drives down the expected insider trading prots and results in less distorted production
decisions, suggesting a substitutable relation between product market and nancial market
competition.
Our results have some important policy implications. First, allowing insider trading in
our setting hurts shareholder interests, but benets the consumers. Second, the product
market and the nancial market are interrelated. When one market is being regulated, the
other market will be a¤ected as well. For example, restricting some insiders from trading in
a rms stock softens the competition in the nancial market and leads to higher expected
18
insider trading prots, but intensies the competition in the product market by giving the
managers incentive to overproduce.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1:
We use backward induction to nd the solution to the problem.
In the second stage, we know both the manager and the market maker use linear strate-
gies. That is, d
eV  =  +  eV and P ed+ eu =  + ed+ eu : The manager determines
his demand d for the rms shares by maximizing his trading prot
max
d
E
heV     ed+ eu djeV = V i(22)
= (V     d) d:
Taking the rst order condition w.r.t d and setting it equal to zero, we get
(23) d =
 
2
+
1
2
V:
Clearly, d is a linear function of V with  =  
2
and  = 1
2
:
Based on the managers signal s; we know that the market demand is (ajs)  N

as+ma
a+
; a
a+

.
The corresponding nal rm value is thus eV  N bq as+ma
a+
  bq ; bq2 a
a+

: Since eD =
+
eV + eu ; we know eD is normally distributed with eD  N  + bq as+ma
a+
  bq ; 2bq2 a
a+
+ u

:
The market makers market clearing condition is
p (D) = E
heV jDi
= E
heV j +  eV + ui(24)
= +  (d+ u) ;
indicating eD and eV have a var-cov matrix" bq2 a
a+
bq2 a
a+
bq2 a
a+
2bq2 a
a+
+ u
#
:
The market maker draws inference from eD and updates her belief about eV by setting
(25)  =
bq2 a
a+
2bq2a + u ;
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and
(26)  = bqas+ ma
a + 
  bq  bq2 aa+
2bq2 a
a+
+ u

 + bqas+ ma
a + 
  bq :
Solving for the unknowns, we have
 =  
p
uq
a
a+

as+ ma
a + 
  bq
 =
p
ubqq a
a+
;
 = bqas+ ma
a + 
  bq ;
 =
1
2
bq
u
r
u
a
a + 
:
The price for the rms stock is therefore
(27) p (D) =
1
2
bq as+ ma
a + 
  bq+ (ea  bq) + 1
u
r
u
a
a + 
eu! :
The managers demand for the rms stock is
(28) d =  
p
uq
a
a+

as+ ma
a + 
  bq+ puq
a
a+
(ea  bq) :
The managers trading prot is therefore
E
heV   p di
= E
26664
bq as+ma
a+
  bq  1
2
bq as+ma
a+
  bq+ (ea  bq) + 1
u
q
u
a
a+
eu0@  pur
a
a+

as+ma
a+
  bq+ pur
a
a+
(ea  bq)
1A
37775(29)
= E
24 pu
2bqq a
a+
((bq (ea  bq))  bq (a  bq))2
35 :
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Conditional on not yet knowing ea, the above trading prot is
bq
2
r
u
a
a + 
:
Now we consider the rst stage of the game, when the manager makes the quantity
decision for the rm. The managers objective function is a combination of trading prots
 and rm value V . The managers problem is:
maxbq E [] + ! [V ](30)
= !bqas+ ma
a + 
  bq+ bq
2
r
u
a
a + 
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq and setting it equal to zero, we have
bq = 2!

as+ma
a+

+
q
u
a
a+
4!
:
B Proof of Corollary 2:
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know the managers trading prot is
E
heV   P di = E [bq]
2
r
u
a
a + 
= E

aes+ ma
a + 
r
u
a
a + 
+
1
2!
u
a
a + 
:
Since the E [es] = ma; we know the E haes+maa+ i = ma: Thus the above simplies to
E [] = ma
r
u
a
a + 
+
1
2!
u
a
a + 
:
Taking the rst order derivative of E [] with regard to , we have
@
@
 
ma
r
u
a
a + 
+
1
2!
u
a
a + 
!
=
1
2!
a
 (a + )
 r
au

a + 
+ !ma
!r
au

a + 
> 0:
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Thus E [] increases in ; or decreases in 1 :
C Proof of Corollary 3:
When insider trading is allowed, the expected rm prot is
E [V ] = E (E [bq] (ea  E [bq]))
=
1
16!2
 
4!2

E

aes+ ma
a + 
2
  u a
a + 
!
=
1
16!2

4!2m2a   u
a
a + 

:
Examining the relation between expected rm prot and the managers current stake in the
rm,
@
@!
(E [V ]) =
1
8!3
r
u
a
a + 
> 0;
indicating E [V ] increases in !: Examining the relation between expected rm prot and ,
@
@
(E [V ]) =   1
16!2
2a
u
(a + )
2 < 0;
indicating E [V ] decreases in , or increases in accounting precision 1 :
D Proof of Proposition 4:
Again, we use backward induction to nd the solution.
In the second stage, manager 1 and the market maker 1 use linear strategies d1 (V1) =
1 + 1eV1 and P1 ed1 + eu = 1 + 1 ed1 + eu : Manager i determines di by maximizing his
trading prot
max
d1
E
heV1   1   1 ed1 + eu d1jeV1 = V1i(31)
= (V1   1   1d1) d1:
Taking the rst order condition w.r.t d1 and setting it equal to zero, we get
(32) 1 =
 1
21
25
and
(33) 1 =
1
21
:
Based on the two managerssignals s1 and s2; we know that the updated market demand
is (ajs1; s2)  N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a
2a+

. The corresponding nal rm value is thus eV1 
N
bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ; bq21 a2a+ : Since eD1 = 1 + 1 eV1 + eu ; we know eD1 is
normally distributed with eD1  N 1 + 1bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ; 21bq21 a2a+ + u :
We also know that eV1 and eD1 are bivariate normal with eV1eD1
!
 N2
24 bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2
1 + 1bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ;
bq21 a2a+ 1bq21 a2a+
1bq21 a2a+ 21bq21 a2a+ + u
35 :
Market maker 1 thus decides that
(34) 1 =
1bq21 a2a+
21bq21 a2a+ + u
and
1 = bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)2a +    bq1   bq2

  1bq21 a2a+
21bq21 a2a+ + u

1 + 1bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)2a +    bq1   bq2

:(35)
Solving for the unknowns, we have
1 =  
p
uq
a2
2a+
2


ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  bq1   bq2
1 =
p
ubq1q a2a+
1 = bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)2a +    bq1   bq2

1 =
1
2
bq1
u
r
u
a
2a + 
:
The price for rm 1s share is therefore
26
P1 (D1) =
1
2
bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  bq1   bq2
+
1
2
bq1 (ea  bq1   bq2) + 1
2u
bq1ru a
2a + 
eu;(36)
and manager 1s trading prot conditional on not knowing V1 is
E
heV1   eP1 d1i(37)
=
bq1
2
r
u
a
2a + 
:
In the rst stage, manager 1 decides his production quantity bq1 by maximizing his total
payo¤. His problem is:
maxbq1 !E
heV1i+ E [1]
= !bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  bq1   bq2+ bq1
2
r
u
a
2a + 
(38)
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq1 and setting it equal to zero, we have
bq1 = 2!

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
  bq2+qu a2a+
4!
:
The problem facing manager 2 and market maker 2 is identical. Applying symmetry, we
have bq1 = bq2 = 1
6!
 
2!
ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
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E Proof of Corollary 5:
Substituting the solutions from Proposition 4, we know the manager is expected trading
prot E [i] is
E
heV1   eP1 d1i = E [bqi]
2
r
u
a
2a + 
=
u
12!
a
2a + 
+
1
6
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 
r
u
a
2a + 
=
u
12!
a
2a + 
+
ma
6
r
u
a
2a + 
:(39)
Taking the rst order derivative of E [i] with regard to , we have
@
@
E [i]
=
1
6!
a

!ma +
q
au

2a+
2a + 
r
au

2a + 
> 0:
F Proof of Corollary 6:
Given the solutions in Proposition 4, the expected rm value when insider trading is
allowed is
E
heVii = E [E [bqi] (ea  E [bqi]  E [bqj])]
=
1
6!
 
2!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
 
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

  2
 
1
6!
 
2!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
=
1
6!
 
2!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
1
3!
 
2!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
:
Further, taking the rst order derivative of E [Vi] when insider trading is allowed, we
have
@
@!
E [Vi]
=
2au + (2!ama + !ma)
q
au

2a+
18!3 (2a + )
> 0:
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Again, we see the expected rm value increases in the managers stake in the rm. Taking
the rst order derivative of E [i] with regard to , we have
@
@
E [Vi]
=   1
18!2
a

!ma + 2
q
au

2a+
2a + 
r
au

2a + 
< 0;
the expected rm value increases in the accounting precision 1

.
G Proof of Proposition 7:
All market participants including the managers and the market makers observe the quan-
tity decisions bq1 and bq2. They also all agree that the variance of rm 1s value eV1 would bebq21 a2a+ . The solution to the second-stage game is thus the same as in Proposition 4.
Manager 1s trading prot conditional on not knowing V1 is also the same,
bq1
2
q
u
a
2a+
:
In the rst stage, manager 1 chooses his production quantity bq1 by maximizing his total
payo¤:
maxbq1 !E
heV1i+ E [1]
= !bq1as1 + ma
a + 
  bq1   E [bq2]+ bq1
2
r
u
a
2a + 
(40)
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq1, we have
bq1 = 2!

as1+ma
a+
  E [bq2]+qu a2a+
4!
:
Applying symmetry, we know
bq2 = 2!

as1+ma
a+
  E [bq1]+qu a2a+
4!
:
Since manager 1 does not know manager 2s signal s2 yet at this stage of the game, he can
only expect rm 2s manager to make production quantity decision based on the original
information a: Thus we know
E [bq2] = 2! (ma   bq1) +
q
u
a
2a+
4!
29
and
E [bq1] = 2! (ma   bq2) +
q
u
a
2a+
4!
:
Solving for unknowns, we have
bq1 = 1
6!
 
2!

2
as1 + ma
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
and bq2 = 1
6!
 
2!

2
as2 + ma
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
H Proof of Proposition 8:
Let d11
eV1 = 11 + 11eV1 be the demand manager 1 submits for rm 1s shares; and
d12
eV1 = 12 +12eV1 be the demand manager 1 submits for rm 2s shares. Let d22 eV2 =
22 +22eV2 be the demand manager 2 submits for rm 2s shares, and d21 eV2 = 21 +21eV2
be the demand manager 2 submits for rm 1s shares. Market maker 1 sets the linear pricing
strategy p1
ed11 + ed21 + eu1 = 1+1 ed11 + ed21 + eu1 ; and market maker 2 sets the strategy
p2
ed22 + ed12 + eu2 = 2 + 2 ed22 + ed12 + eu2 :
Manager 1 maximizes his trading prots from both rm 1s shares and rm 2s shares
E
heV1   ep1 d11jeV1 = V1i+ E hE heV2i  ep2 d12jeV1 = V1i :
Since the production quantities are public information, and both managers observe the re-
alized common market demand ea = a, the two managers know each others rm values
perfectly. That is, manager 1s objective function is
max
d11;d12
E
heV1   ep1 d11jeV1 = V1i+ E heV2   ep2 d12jeV2 = V2i
= (V1   1   1 (d11 + d21)) d11 + (V2   2   2 (d12 + d22)) d12
Taking the rst order condition with regard to d11 and d12 we have
eV1   1   21d11   1d21 = 0;
30
and eV2   2   22d12   2d22 = 0:
Manager 2s problem is symmetric to manager 1s. Thus we know
d11 =   1
21

 eV1 + 1 + 1d21 ;
d12 =   1
22

 eV2 + 2 + 2d22 ;
d22 =   1
22

 eV2 + 2 + 2d12 ;
d21 =   1
21

 eV1 + 1 + 1d11 ;
which is equivalent to
11 = 21 =
 1
31
; 11 = 21 =
1
31
;
12 = 22 =
 2
32
; 12 = 22 =
1
32
:
We know that market maker 1s strategy is
P1
 eD1 = 1 + 1 eD1
= 1 + 1

11 + 11eV1 + 21 + 21eV2 + eu1 :
Again eV1 and eD1 are bivariate normally distributed with mean values bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2
and 11 + 11bq1 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2+ 21 + 21bq2 ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ; respec-
tively. Their var-cov matrix is" bq21 a2a+ 11bq21 a2a+
11bq21 a2a+  211bq21 + 221bq22 a2a+ + u
#
:
Thus, we have
1 =
11bq21 a2a+ 
211bq21 + 221bq22 a2a+ + u ;
1 = E
heV1i  1E h eD1i ;
2 =
22bq22 a2a+ 
22bq22 + 212bq21 a2a+ + u ;
2 = E
heV2i  2E h eD2i :
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Solving for all the unknowns, we get
11 =   1p
2bq21 bq22
p
ur
a
2a+
(2bq1   bq2)ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ;
12 =   1p
2bq22 bq21
p
ur
a
2a+
(2bq1   bq1)ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq2   bq1 ;
11 =
1p
2bq21 bq22
p
u
a
2a+
;
12 =
1p
2bq22 bq21
p
u
a
2a+
;
1 = (2bq1   bq2)ma+a(s1+s2)2a+   bq1   bq2 ;
1 =
p
2bq21 bq22
3
r
a
2a+p
u
:
For manager 2 and market maker 2, the solutions are symmetric.
Substituting the solutions into manager 1s total trading protE [(V1   1   1 (d11 + d21)) d11]
+E [(V2   2   2 (d12 + d22)) d12], conditional on manager 1 does not know the nal value
of a, we know his total expected trading prot is
E
24 1
3
p
2bq21   bq22
p
uq
a
2a+
eV1   (2V1   V2)2
35
+E
24 1
3
q
2bq22   bq12
p
uq
a
2a+
eV1   (2V2   V1)2
35
=
bq21qu a2a+
3
p
2bq21   bq22 +
bq22qu a2a+
3
p
2bq22   bq21 :
Manager 1 thus maximizes his total payo¤ by choosing quantity bq1:
maxbq1 !
bq1ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  bq1   bq2+ bq21
q
u
a
2a+
3
p
2bq21   bq22 +
bq22qu a2a+
3
p
2bq22   bq21
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq1, we have
!

ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
  2bq1   bq2+ 1
3
r
u
a
2a + 
 
2bq1 (bq21   bq22)
(2bq21   bq22) 32 +
bq1bq22
(2bq22   bq21) 32
!
= 0:
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Manager 2s problem is symmetric. Applying symmetry and solving for bq1 = bq2; we get
bq1 = bq2 = 1
9!
 
3!
ma + a (s1 + s2)
2a + 
+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
I Proof of Corollary 9:
Substituting the solutions from Proposition 8, we know the manager is expected trading
prot E [i] is
E [i] =
E [bq]
3
r
u
a
2a + 
=
u
27!
a
2a + 
+
1
9
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 
r
u
a
2a + 
=
u
27!
a
2a + 
+
ma
9
r
u
a
2a + 
(41)
Taking the rst order derivative of E [i] with regard to , we have
@
@
E [i]
=
1
9!
a

!ma +
q
au

2a+
2a + 
r
au

2a + 
> 0:
J Proof of Corollary 10:
The expected rm value when insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in both
own and rival rmsstocks is
E
heVii = E [E [bqi] (ea  E [bqi]  E [bqj])]
=
1
9!
 
3!E

ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
 
E

ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 

  2
 
1
9!
 
3!E

ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
=
1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
! 
ma   2
 
1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
!!!
:
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Taking the rst order derivative of E [Vi] when insider trading is allowed, we have
@
@!
E [Vi]
=

4au + (6!a + 3!)ma
q
au

2a+

81!3 (2a + )
> 0:
Again, we see the expected rm value increases in the managers stake in the rm. Taking
rst order derivative of E [Vi] with regard to , we have
@
@
E [Vi]
=   1
81!2
a

3!ma + 4
q
au

2a+
2a + 
r
au

2a + 
< 0;
implying that E [Vi] increases in accounting precision 1 :
K Proof of Proposition 11:
The solution to the second-stage game is thus the same as in Proposition 8.
In the rst stage, manager 1 chooses his production quantity bq1 by maximizing his total
payo¤:
maxbq1 !
bq1ma + as1
a + 
  bq1   E [bq2]+ bq21
q
u
a
2a+
3
p
2bq21   E [bq22] +
E [bq22]qu a2a+
3
p
2E [bq22]  bq21
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq1, we have
!

ma + as1
a + 
  2bq1   E bq22+13
r
u
a
2a + 
 
2bq1 (bq21   E [bq22])
(2bq21   E [bq22]) 32 +
bq1E [bq22]
(2E [bq22]  bq21) 32
!
= 0:
Since manager 1 does not know manager 2s signal s2 yet at this stage of the game, he can
only expect rm 2s manager to make production quantity decision based on the original
information a: Thus
! (ma   2E [bq1]  E [bq2])+1
3
r
u
a
2a + 
 
2E [bq1] (E [bq21]  E [bq22])
(2E [bq21]  E [bq22]) 32 +
bq1E [bq22]
(2E [bq22]  E [bq21]) 32
!
= 0:
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That is
E [bq1] = E [bq2] = 1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
Applying symmetry and solving for unknowns, we have
bq1 = 1
9!
 
3!

2
ma + as1
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
;
and bq2 = 1
9!
 
3!

2
ma + as2
a + 
 ma

+
r
u
a
2a + 
!
:
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